FREE
LEGAL AID IN KAZAKHSTAN
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The low pay rates do not generate competition among the lawyers to obtain new cases – they know
that no matter what happens they will be given another case and therefore show little interest in
achieving a favorable outcome or upgrading
their professional skills;
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The low pay level drives a lawyer to take on maximum number of cases to deal with as an appointed
counsel. With the best will of the world, it is hard to provide quality defense services in such
circumstances. And the lawyers themselves will never strive to the best performance being focused
on observing procedural formalities;
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This mechanism deprives the lawyers of the motivation for the final outcome of their labor. The
appointed counsels get their hourly wage, at a minimum but stable rate, regardless of the result of
the case. Furthermore, whereas private counsels have to value their reputation and handle the case
with the utmost responsibility, professionalism, and diligence in order to uphold their image in their
search for new clients, the court-appointed attorneys simply do not have to do so. They do not depend
on their clients;
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Apart from the shortcomings in the appointing procedure per se, there are also concerns about its
transparency. The corruption is inevitable where highly professional services are underpaid. For
example, the judicial and investigative authorities can appoint a counsel of their own choosing, with
the latter often being the most “passive” lawyer who will not cause unnecessary trouble;
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The low public awareness of the legal aid procedures and defense possibilities often cause the person
on trial, on remand, or the suspect, to be inclined to offer bribes. The bribe is presented as the simplest
solution, out of all the tools existing in the defendant’s understanding, to remedy the situation, and
the lawyer can be the best mediator in this case. Moreover, the low pay of the appointed counsels, as
well as with the negative public attitude towards them, feeds the further spread of corruption.
Some of these shortcomings can be tackled by establishing the procedure for the appointment of a counsel
under the supervision of some independent administrative coordinator body. In many countries, such a body
is represented by a non-profit organization, while in others it is set up on the initiative of the central and
regional authorities, remaining independent, though being closely connected with the state. A simplified form
of such a system could be a small unit established within the bar and charged with distribution of cases
among the lawyers on a principle of rotation, which is essential for such type of cases, and on the basis of
the lawyers’ qualifications and work load. However, the shortcomings such as the remuneration for a limited
number of defense actions only, focus on observance of formalities rather than real protection activities, and
unrealistically low fees resulting in the loss of counsel’s motivation can be eradicated only through a change
in the counsel appointment procedure.
The above-mentioned shortcomings of the existing model provoke interest in other models of providing and
funding free legal aid that have been successfully tested in different countries.